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THE HOIIBBOAT STRIKE OF 1925: 
BRITISH SEAllEN AND SOUTH AFRIW CQHHUNITY FtEACTIONS(1) 
Baruch Hirson 
The Strike Across the Seas 
On 1 August 1925, British seamen, on shore or on the high seas, had their monthly 
wages cut from S10 to f9, on the initiative of Havelock Wilson, General President of 
the National Sailors and Firemen's Union of Great Britain and Ireland (NSFU). Many 
who were about to embark in British ports stayed ashore; and those at sea, who 
landed in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and elsewhere, came out on strike 
and stayed out for periods up to three months. 
A strike in the merchant marine in 1925 was a serious matter for the 
economies of Britain and the Dominions. Air travel was still exceptional: 
exporters of raw materials, agricultural produce, and manufactured goods relied on 
regular sailings; and mail and people went more commonly by ship. Any prolonged 
delay was bound to affect farmers, tr-aders and manufacturers, but the intensity of 
the class struggle in the mid-twenties had reached a point where governments, and 
sections of the ruling class in Europe, were prepared to g ~ b l e  with local economies 
in order to smash the working-class movement. 
The seamen might have looked like a soft target for wage cuts in Britain, 
at a time when miners, railwaymen and others threatened to defy the government on 
the issue of wage cuts. There was large-scale unemployment in the merchant marine, 
and the NSFU, which negotiated directly with the shipowners through the National 
Maritime Board, made the offer of a wage cut, at a time when the trade union 
movement was fighting moves by the Baldwin government to secure such cuts in the 
coal and other industries. The seamen were split, occupationally, regionally, and 
politically: many belonged to the splinter Amalgamated Marine Workers Union (AMWU), 
which had its strongholds in Glasgow and Southampton, but also carried membership 
cards of the NSFU, which was required if they were to secure a berth in British 
ships. 
Wilson relied on the fact that seamen in Britain could not sustain a 
strike, and in this he was correct. The seamen's action against wage cuts faltered, 
and seemed to collapse at an early stage. The NSFU opposed industrial action 
generally, and, having been party to the cuts, condemned the seamen who stayed out. 
The splinter union, the AMWU, was irresolute and repudiated the strike throughout 
August. All responsibility for the seamen's action was assumed by the National 
Minority Movement (NMM) (21, and it was they who set up the unofficial strike 
committee in London, consisting mainly of members of the NSFU, but including George 
Hardy, a non-sailor who led the transport section of the W. (3) However, despite 
the anger of the rank and file in Britain, the shipowners brought in scabs from the 
northern ports, and most ships sailed, albeit with some delays. Furthermore, the 
tugboat men worked normally, and the  AMWU, t o  which they belonged, refused t o  c a l l  
them out  throughout the  seven weeks of  the  s t r i k e  i n  Br i ta in ,  on the  grounds t h a t  
they were governed by a separate agreement. (4)  
The events i n  Br i t a in  w i l l  be discussed elsewhere, and it w i l l  be 
suggested there  t h a t  t h i s  s t r i k e  must be seen a s  a prelude t o  the  general s t r i k e  of 
1926. That w i l l  a l s o  be the  place t o  discuss the  r o l e  of Havelock Wilson, Liberal 
MP, ant i -socia l is t  and Empire p a t r i o t ,  and the  leading supporter of the  Spencer 
union which broke away from t h e  National Union of Miners i n  1926 ( 5 ) ;  the  f a c t  t h a t  
the  s t r i k e  was a s  much agains t  the  NSFU a s  against  the shipowners; and a l s o  the  
r o l e  of Emmanuel Shinwell, leader of the  AMWU, whose i r r e so lu te  and divis ive  r o l e  
did not  help t h e  seamen i n  t h e i r  struggle.  (6)  However, the  fac to r  which a l t e red  
the  course of the  s t r i k e ,  and which no one had foreseen, w a s  t he  ac t ion i n  overseas 
ports .  Over and above the  attempts t o  s top ships  leaving Bri ta in ,  some 10-15,000 
men walked o f f  the  ships  i n  the  Dominions, and other por t s ,  and it was t h e i r  action,  
together with t h a t  of tens  of thousands of  men and women who supported them, t h a t  
kept the  s t r i k e  going f o r  two t o  th ree  months. 
The f i r s t  stoppage was i n  Austral ia on 21 August, where the  s a i l o r s  were 
for tunate  i n  obtaining the  backing of the Seamen's Union of  Austral ia (SUA) - 
themselves locked i n  b a t t l e  with the  government over l o c a l  s t r i k e  action.  (7) There 
were few s a i l o r s  avai lable  a s  scab labour i n  Australia, and the  s t r i k e  continued, 
with the a id  of the  SUA, f o r  almost th ree  months. Par t ly  inspired by news of the  
ac t ion i n  Austral ia,  and a l s o  because of t h e i r  own anger a t  receiving reduced wages, 
there  were s t r i k e s  i n  o ther  coun t r t i e s  within the week. 
South Africa: the  S t r ike  i n  Durban 
On 24 August the  Australian crew o f  the  "Apolda", a steamer chartered by the  South 
African government, demanded Australian wages and conditions, and the  SUA demanded 
t h a t  t h i s  be adhered to ,  o r  a l l  South African ships would be blacked. The event w a s  
not  connected with the  Br i t i sh  seamen's s t r i k e ,  but i n  the  charged atmosphere of the  
time t h i s  acted a s  a ca ta lys t ,  and two days l a t e r  the  crews of th ree  ships  were 
reported t o  have come ou t  on s t r i k e  i n  Durban. The men agreed t o  work i n  por t ,  but 
would not  s a i l  unless t h e i r  grievances were attended to.  There were repor t s  t h a t  
other crews were thinking of joining them. (8) From Durban the  s t r i k e  spread t o  
Cape Town and, with stoppages i n  East London and i n  Lourenco Marques, the re  was only 
r e s t r i c t e d  sea  t r a f f i c  between the  South African por t s ,  o r  between the  country and 
the outside world, f o r  forty-seven days. (9 )  
Economically, the  s t r i k e  affected South Africa badly. To maintain a 
favourable balance of t rade ,  it w a s  estimated t h a t  South Africa needed a surplus of 
v i s i b l e  exports over v i s i b l e  imports o f  f15,000,000. A s  i ndus t r i a l  exports were 
negligible,  the  only exports, besides gold and diamonds, were food and wool, and the  
optimum months f o r  South Africa were from August t o  October. In  1925 p l e n t i f u l  
r a i n ,  and control  of pes ts  and b l igh t ,  had l ed  t o  bumper crops a f t e r  years of 
depression, and delays i n  shipping could severely a f f e c t  the  country and loca l  
farming communities. (10) Maize and oranges due f o r  export were s tored i n  the  por t s  
o r  the  countryside - the  oranges i n  danger of ro t t ing ,  and the  maize a t t r a c t i n g  
r a t s ,  with the  added danger of  plague. (11) Imported food, including f l o u r ,  was i n  
shor t  supply, and more general imports - some ordered f o r  the  Christmas season - 
were threatened. (12) Besides consumer goods, the overseas mail was delayed, and 
machinery required by the  mines was e i t h e r  held up i n  Europe o r  lay i n  the  ships ' s  
holds, i n  danger of rust ing.  (13) Gold w a s  not  exported; bunker coal ,  used by the  
shipping l i n e s ,  was unsold; and o s t r i c h  fea thers  lay neglected i n  storage,  while 
the  European market f o r  t h i s  foppery collapsed. 
In  t h e  wake of the  seamen's action,  the  government was drawn i n t o  the  
discussions on the  s t r i k e .  The Nationalist  Party, under Hertzog, were i n i t i a l l y  
opposed,to the  s t r i k e  and supported the  NSFU i n  its c a l l  f o r  the  seamen t o  re turn  t o  
t h e i r  posts. However, being a l l i e d  t o  Labour, they seem t o  have l e f t  a l l  the  
ta lk ing t o  Creswell, the  leader of the  Labour Party, but it can be noted t h a t  the  
Nationalists ,  keen republicans a s  they were, would not have responded kindly t o  
Havelock Wilsonts claim t h a t  the  s t r i k e  was a p l o t  by men who wished t o  break up the  
Br i t i sh  Empire. The South African Labour Party (SALP) entered the  f i e l d ,  both as 
member of  the  pac t  government and because it still had r e a l  l i n k s  with the  white 
t rade  unions. This threatened t o  t e a r  the party apart :  some, l i k e  Colonel 
Creswell, the Minister of Labour, wanted t o  end the s t r i k e ,  and offered t o  a c t  a s  
intermediaries between shipowners and seamen; others,  l i k e  Walter Madeley and 
Morris Kentridge, expressed ( a t  l e a s t  i n i t i a l l y )  support f o r  the  seamen, and both 
fac t ions  had t o  balance the  needs of workers with those of  the  farmers, who were the  
concern of  t h e i r  coa l i t ion  partners.  The white t rade  unions who contributed funds 
t o  the  
,penn i l e ss  seamen were a l s o  drawn i n t o  the  conf l i c t ,  and the  money they donated was 
used i n  Cape Town t o  lever  the  seamen away from Communist Party (CPSA) supporters. 
The CPSA, which had a branch i n  Cape Town (but not  noticeably i n  Durban), contacted 
the  s t r i k e r s  on the i n i t i a t i v e  of one of  its members, Solomon Biurski, and t h i s  
a l e r t ed  branches i n  severa l  towns t o  form support groups, and conduct a campaign t o  
back the  s t r i k e r s '  demands. 
However, t h a t  is running ahead of  the  story.  F i r s t ,  we must look at  the  
s i tua t ion  i n  Durban, and the  ag i t a t ion  which followed the  sentencing of two seamen 
on 28 August, the  first dozens of such cases, f o r  refusing t o  obey the  lawful 
commands of the  master. They received fourteen dayst imprisonment with hard labour, 
suspended f o r  two weeks, subject  t o  t h e i r  immediate re turn  t o  duties.  (14) 
There w a s  fu r the r  unrest  amongst the  s t r i k e r s  when Reuters reported on 1 
September t h a t  the  Union Castle Line was rec ru i t ing  700 lasca r s  i n  Bombay t o  replace 
exis t ing crews. From that .day,  dai ly  meetings were ca l led  a t  the  Cape Town Gardens 
t o  put  the  s a i l o r ' s  case t o  the  public, and t h i s  became the  stamping ground of town 
council lor  H H Kemp, and the  paralysed ex-miner, Dan Simons, who more usually sold 
tobacco and c iga re t t e s  from h i s  wheel chai r  near the  Gardens. (15) 
Kemp was expelled from the  SALP i n  May 1924 when he opposed t h e  o f f i c i a l  
party nominee i n  the  general e lec t ion.  He l o s t ,  and then ca l l ed  f o r  the  formation 
of a new par ty  which would el iminate a l l  Asia t ics  from South Africa. (16) There was 
a large  crowd a t  the  f i r s t  meeting, and it was then t h a t  Simons,.who "neglected h i s  
businessft,  shouted support f o r  the  seamen, and organised a col lec t ion f o r  the  s i x  
men who were due t o  appear i n  cour t  the  next day. Henceforth, Simons presided a t  
a l l  meetings i n  the Gardens, and was l a t e r  appointed President of  the  Durban s t r i k e  
committee. Kemp was the  main speaker a t  the  second meeting and the  crowd t h a t  
gathered was s t a t ed  t o  be 15,000 strong. He reminded h i s  audience t h a t  he had 
always stood f o r  the  explusion of a l l  Asiat ics from South Africa, and s a i d  t h a t  i f  
l a sca r s  ar r ived i n  Durban he would lead the  c i t i zens  of the  town i n  throwing them 
i n t o  the  Indian Ocean. 
Other speakers brought messages of so l ida r i ty  from the  Labour Party, and 
from the  white t r ade  unions, but it was Kemp who dominated the  gathering, and 
r a l l i e d  the  widest support. He spoke again the  next day a t  a meeting of (white) 
railwaymen. When he mentioned the  l a sca r s  he was greeted by c r i e s  o f  "Bravo KempIt 
and "Up Boys and a t  'em". He spoke again of  h i s  many previous anti-Asiatic 
campaigns. ( 17) 
Kempts campaign t o  secure Indian repa t r i a t ion  w a s  ne i ther  unique nor 
or ig inal .  It was the  policy of a l l  administrations t o  secure the  removal of  Indians 
from South Africa, and i n  the period 1923-25 measures designed t o  force  Indians t o  
emigrate had been introduced i n  the  Natal Provincial Council and Parliament. In  
Natal, Indians had been deprived of the  municipal franchise,  and of the  r i g h t  t o  buy 
o r  lease  land i n  the  towns. Pat r ick  Duncan introduced a Class Areas B i l l  i n  
Parliament i n  1924 t o  provide f o r  compulsory segregation of Indians f o r  t rading and 
res iden t i a l  purposes, but  the  Smuts government f e l l  i n  June 1924, before the  B i l l  
could be passed. D r  Malan, the  Minister of the In te r io r  i n  the  Nationalist-Labour 
Pact government, reintroduced the  measure a s  the  Areas Reservation B i l l  i n  mid-1925, 
with even more s t r ingen t  measures t o  r e s t r i c t  Indian r igh t s .  Although the  B i l l  was 
shelved, it stood a s  a permanent t h r e a t  t o  Indian r i g h t s  t o  remain i n  South Africa. 
(18) 
Mass meetings of Indians were held i n  Durban t o  p ro tes t  agains t  the  
Reservation B i l l  and c a l l  f o r  t h e  convening of a Round Table Conference t o  discuss 
t h e i r  pos i t ion i n  the  country. A t  t he  same time, the  South African Indian Congress 
(SAIC) issued a statement expressing "deep regret1' over the  planned importation of 
l a sca r s  a s  scabs. The SAIC drew a p a r a l l e l  between the  importation of l a sca r s  and . 
the  o r ig ina l  use of indentured labour i n  the  sugar e s t a t e s  of Natal: both events 
led  t o  anti-Indian campaigns, and the  introduction of l a sca r s  would "intensify the  
a c t i v i t i e s  of the  anti-Asiatics''. They urged ttresponsible leaders  of India" t o  
denounce the shipping companies. (19) 
The Cape Indian Defence Committee held a meeting a t  which speakers were 
more damning. They warned a l l  Indians and l a sca r s  t o  s t a y  away a s  t h i s  Itwas purely 
a white man's dispute,  the more so  i n  t h a t  both s ides ,  i n  t h e i r  capaci t ies  a s  voters  
when on shore, were p a r t i e s  t o  the  repressive l eg i s l a t ion  passed under the  Br i t i sh  
Crown against  t h e i r  Indian fellow-citizens". One speaker was reported a s  c a l l i n g  on 
a l l  Indians not  t o  take s ides  Itin the  dispute of the  white man". (20) 
A s  r epor t s  came i n  t h a t  l a sca r s  were being recrui ted ,  and were on t h e i r  
way, the agi ta ted  Indian organisations grew ever more apprehensive. Amod Bayat, 
President of the  Natal Indian Congress, s e n t  cables t o  "prominent p e r s ~ n s * ~  i n  India: 
Community here disapproves such action a s  unfa i r  t o  
s t r i k e r s ,  and fu r the r  complicates present Indian 
problem. We implore you keep Indians out  of t h i s  
s t r i k e  so  preserve Indian honour. Suggest r e c a l l  any 
l a sca r s  already l e f t .  (21) 
Abdul Karim of the  Natal Indian Association a l s o  cabled the  Viceroy of India and 
Pandit Motilal Nehru on s imi lar  l i n e s ,  saying t h a t ,  
Arrival  of l a sca r s  i n  South Africa when a l l  minds a r e  
agi ta ted  over t h e  new Asiatic B i l l  w i l l  be d isas t rous  
t o  Indian in te res t s .  Local Indians strongly resent  
Indian seamen being exploited a s  s t r i k e  breakers and 
t o t a l l y  condemn ac t ion  of shipowners i n  rushing t o  
India unmindful of ser ious  i ssues  involved. Pray 
r e c a l l  lascars .  (22) 
The Times of India r e f l ec ted  l o c a l  concern when it condemned the  
recruitment of scabs, warning t h a t  they could be hur t ,  and t h a t  the re  could be 
unpleasant consequences f o r  the  whole Indian community i n  South Africa. (23) The 
General Secretary of the  Indian Seamen's Union a l so  condemned the  use of lascars ,  
and pointed out  t h a t  attempts t o  use such crews i n  the  shipping s t r i k e  i n  China had 
f a i l e d ,  and the  scabs had been s e n t  packing. He concluded by asking t h e  o f f i c i a l s  
of the A l l  India TUC t o  s top any l a sca r s  signing up f o r  South Africa. (24) Whether 
l a sca r s  were ever recrui ted  remains a mystery. The Times of India ca r r i ed  
conf l ic t ing repor ts :  t h a t  inqu i r i e s  had been made about the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of Indian 
crews from loca l  agents of shipping companies; t h a t  such crews could be supplied; 
and then si lence.  (25) 
I f  attempts were made t o  r a i s e  the  640 scabs the  Union Castle l i n e  was 
s a i d  t o  have requested, they were never sent .  But the  repor t  did not  s top intense 
agi ta t ion throughout South Africa. The press  carr ied  copious repor t s  (and rumours) 
on the matter and Die Burger was quoted a s  saying t h a t  "Public opinion w i l l  not  
permit it, and we f e a r  it w i l l  merely give r i s e  t o  undesirable emotional excitement 
and even t o  worse things". (26) It w a s  a l s o  reported t h a t  Prime Minister Hertzog 
received hundreds of telegrams from a l l  over the  country protes t ing against  the  use 
of l a sca r s  a s  s t r i k e  breakers, and t h i s  evoked a response from the  Cabinet i n  which 
it was s t a t ed  that :  
Under the  law, lascars ,  being Asiatics,  a r e  prohibited 
immigrants, and the  Master of the  ship bringing such 
persons t o  a por t  of the  Union is ordered t o  r e t a i n  
such persons on h i s  ship  and t o  remove them from the  
Union, f a i l i n g  which he is subject  t o  heavy penalt ies.  
Landing f o r  temporary purposes o r  trans-shipment is 
not permitted without the  consent of the Immigration 
author i t ies .  The Government has received no 
information from the  shipowners, who a re  well aware of  
the  law i f  any such s t ep  is taken a s  t h a t  indicated by 
Reuters' telegram. (27) 
The issue  was dead, and when it was reported on 17 September t h a t  l a sca r s  who were 
on ships involved i n  the  s t r i k e  i n  Durban were f ra te rn i s ing  with t h e i r  white 
colleagues there  was no noticeable reaction.  
Seventeen Br i t i sh  vessels  were i n  Durban harbour i n  ea r ly  September, and 
1,235 men were ashore (including 200 engineers, o f f i ce r s  and others  who were not 
involved i n  the  d ispute) .  The men l e f t  the  ships,  a f t e r  events i n  Cape Town opened 
the poss ib i l i ty  of ships  being taken three  miles out  t o  sea ,  where they might be 
ordered t o  work, o r  face  mutiny charges. (28) The men were b i l l e t e d  i n  the houses 
of sympathisers, occupied corners i n  work sheds, or  camped i n  open spaces. They 
were able t o  purchase food with funds collected by t rade  unions ( including the 
Indust r ia l  and Commercial Workers Union - I C U )  and Labour o r  Communist groups 
throughout South Africa. (29) 
There were set-backs f o r  the  s t r i k e r s .  Men were being s e n t  t o  prison,  or  
faced charges a r i s ing  from the  s t r i k e .  Furthermore, some ships s a i l e d  with skeleton 
crews, o r  with loca l ly  recrui ted  scabs, and the  seamen a l s o  watched helpless ly  when 
Br i t i sh  vessels  manned by l a sca r s ,  or  non-British ships,  loaded produce and sa i l ed  
f o r  Europe. (30) None the  l e s s ,  the  seamen remained firm, and a% the  end of 
September a b a l l o t  of a l l  s t r i k e r s  showed t h a t  only t h i r t y  voted t o  r e tu rn  t o  
work. (31) However, the  s t r i k e  was coming t o  an end i n  many por t s ,  and on 12 
October the  AMWU declared i n  Br i ta in  t h a t  the action was over. The London s t r t i k e  
committee held out  f o r  another week, and then conceded defeat .  This d id  not a f fec t  
the s t r i k e r s  i n  Austral ia,  and it did not  lead t o  the  end on act ion i n  Durban. the 
s t r i k e  was declared over i n  South Africa only on 24 October, and i n  November many 
seamen were st i l l  out i n  Durban (32) ,  and many were t o  remain without a berth when 
the  l a s t  ship sa i l ed  away. 
Action i n  Cape Town 
Events i n  Cape Town were transformed i n  ea r ly  September by the  ent ry  of communists 
i n t o  the f ray .  For the  f i r s t  week the only groups t h a t  seemed t o  support the  seamen 
were the  white unions o r  the  SALP. In Durban, members of the  Labour Party took 
money and comforts t o  the  crews, and the  Transvaal Labour Party Conference, meeting 
on 30 August, passed a resolution supporting the  seamen i n  t h e i r  r e fusa l  t o  work f o r  
reduced wages, and repudiating the  government's support f o r  the  shipping companies. 
Creswell opposed the  resolution on the  grounds t h a t  the seamen were duty bound t o  
honour the agreement entered i n t o  by t h e i r  union (33) ,  but  t h a t  was not  the.only 
reason. The t'Pact'9 government represented both farmers and white workers, and 
Labour Ministers (and members of the  SALP) seemed more concerned about placating the  
farming communities than advancing the  cause of labour. 
The Cape Federation of  Trades, t o  which most (white) t rade  unions were 
a f f i l i a t e d ,  spoke f o r  the  seamen u n t i l  A Z Berman, the  ac t ing secre tary ,  announced: 
f i r s t l y ,  t h a t  the  Federation was approaching the  F r u i t  Exchange ( t h e  government's 
co-operative marketing board) t o  arrange f o r  the  s a i l i n g  of the  "Roman Star" with a 
cargo of oranges (34);  and, secondly, t h a t  the  men were prepared t o  accept the  
res to ra t ion  of the  s t a t u s  quo pending the reopening of the  whole question through 
conci l ia t ion o r  a r b i t r a t i o n  i n  Br i t a in  - and the  postponement of the  new r a t e s  
pending such negotiations. (35) 
That was too much f o r  the  seamen. They had not been consulted on these 
issues,  and they repudiated Berman and the  Federation. (36) It was at  t h i s  s tage  
t h a t  Solomon Biurski appears t o  have met the  men, and e i t h e r  a t  h i s  suggestion o r  
independently e lec ted a s t r i k e  committee, w i t h  Biurski as t h e i r  secre tary  (37); 
they used the CPSA of f i ces  i n  Long S t r e e t  a s  t h e i r  headquarters. Also, par ty  
f a c i l i t i e s  were used t o  hold da i ly  meetings i n  which the  committee put  t h e i r  case t o  
the  public, collected money, arranged b i l l e t i n g ,  and s o  on. (38) 
Biurski claims t h a t  he l ed  the  s t r i k e  action i n  Cape Town, and f o r  a t  
l e a s t  th ree  weeks t h a t  seems t o  have been the  case. On 22 September, S P Bunting 
declared t h a t  a t  t h e  Cape the  s t r i k e  
was being very largely  and material ly ass is ted ,  if  not  
ac tual ly  conducted, by the  Communists, who were always 
associated with any trouble i n  which the workerst 
i n t e r e s t s  were a t  s take.  The Communists took c r e d i t  
f o r  t h a t ,  and t h e i r  object  was t o  secure the  
unconditional surrender of t h e  shipowners, which w a s  
the  only possible condition of settlement ... The men 
were f igh t ing  f o r  8d per day, but  a s  Communists we a r e  
supporting them f o r  something more. (39) 
The f i r s t  i ssue  confronting the  committee was the  f i f t e e n  mill ion oranges 
loaded i n  the  specia l ly  ref r igera ted  hold of the  "Roman Star". Berman and other  
leaders of  the  Cape Labour Party had appealed t o  the  crew not  t o  s t r i k e ,  because the  
ship  had been chartered by the  F r u i t  Exchange (40),  and if the  boat d id  not  s a i l  
many f r u i t  farmers would be ruined. (41) Although the  reason was no t  made public, 
it was the  p l igh t  of the  farmers t h a t  prompted Creswell's announcement t h a t  he would 
mediate between shippers and seamen, t o  f ind a set t lement t o  the  dispute. (42) 
Indeed, the  next day Walter Madeley and Morris Kentridge announced t h a t  they would 
go t o  Cape Town because of  t h e i r  concern about agr icul tura l  cargoes, if  they f e l t  
t h a t  t h e i r  presence ( a s  supporters of the  s t r i k e  a t  the  SALP conference) would 
help. (43) 
On 4 September, Biurski announced t h a t  the  seamen did  not  wish t o  be 
discourteous t o  t h e  government, and would therefore meet Creswell, but  t h a t  the 
dispute could only be s e t t l e d  i n  London. (44) In  h i s  memoir, Biruski describes 
pr ivate  discussions between the  Minister and the  s t r i k e  committee, i n  which he 
appealed t o  the  men t o  l e t  the  ship  s a i l  Itas a gesture t o  t h e  f i r s t  labour 
government ( s i c )  i n  South Africatt.  The men agreed, provided t h a t  it was announced 
i n  every por t  t h a t  the  committee had given its permission, and a l s o  t h a t  the  ship  
re tu rn  t o  Cape Town with the  same crew if the  s t r i k e  was still on. But Creswell had 
no power t o  agree t o  the  terms, and when a b a l l o t  showed t h a t  the  men opposed the  
s a i l i n g ,  t h i s  p a r t  of h i s  mission f e l l  through. (45) 
The ItRoman Star" d id  s a i l ,  but  only because the crew were offered an ex t ra  
26 f o r  the  next year, much t o  t h e  annoyance of  the  shipownersv federation.  (46) 
However, the  journey was not  without its drama: there  was an explosion i n  the  
engine room when a detonator was shovelled i n t o  the  sh ip ' s  furnace, and three  crew 
members were injured. (47) Sabotage was suspected, and Biurski suggested, 
retrospectively,  t h a t  it might have been the work of a fireman who burs t  i n t o  a 
s t r i k e  committee meeting and s a i d  he was volunteering f o r  t h e  crew, but  they were 
not  t o  think badly of him. (48) However, nothing was discovered. 
Other consignments of oranges d id  not  s a i l ,  and there  were repor ts  t h a t  
oranges worth 235,000 would have t o  be dumped i n  Table Bay (49);  it was s a i d  t h a t  
i n  Marico alone c i t r u s  growers and packers l o s t  over 230,000. (50) Other produce 
was a l s o  held up, and maize got  away mainly on foreign ships ,  while dai ry  farmers 
were forced t o  keep back bu t t e r  and eggs and faced considerable losses.  (51) 
Creswell had not  succeeded i n  h i s  e f f o r t s  t o  g e t  the  "Roman Star" out  t o  
sea ,  and he f a i l e d  i n  h i s  more general attempts a t  mediation. The seamen put 
forward demands, some of which Creswell could have met - such a s  the  re lease  of a l l  
s t r i k e r s  from gaol, and a government guarantee not  t o  tow ships  out  t o  the  outer  
anchorage. However, o ther  demands were beyond h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  negotiate.  The seamen 
wanted the  wage cut  restored,  and a l s o  the  abol i t ion of the  Maritime Board ( a  
s t a tu to ry  body on which the  shipowners and the  NSFU were jo in t ly  represented, and a t  
which wages were agreed), and a l s o  demanded t h a t  Havelock Wilson be denied any voice 
i n  the  a f f a i r s  of the  Br i t i sh  mercantile marine. (52) 
I n  the  absence of  any move t o  end the  s t r i k e ,  the  s h i p v s  captains t r i e d  t o  
g e t  t h e i r  ships  out  t o  sea. In  one incident which was t o  a f f e c t  a l l  s t r i k e r s ,  the  
master of the  vvSophoclesvl locked h i s  crew i n  the messroom, and with the  ass is tance  
of the  o f f i c e r s  got  the  ship beyond the  three-mile l i m i t .  The seamen were then 
ordered down t o  the bo i l e r  room, and warned t h a t  non-compliance would lead t o  
charges of mutiny. However, the  seamen re to r t ed  t h a t  they had s t a t e d  when a t  anchor 
t h a t  they would not  s a i l ,  and t h i s  negated the  charge of mutiny. Three hours l a t e r  
the  vSophoclesw was back a t  anchor (53) 
The men of the  vtSophoclesvt put  out  a def iant  statement, and cal led  on a l l  
ships t o  stand f i r m .  (54) It was f e a r  of o ther  captains t ry ing  the  same ruse which 
led  t o  the  crews walking o f f  the  ships  i n  Durban and i n  Cape Town. (55) In  Cape 
Town the  men could not  be b i l l e t e d  by sympathisers, although many famil ies  d id  
accommodate numbers of men. Assistance was sought, and the  men were taken t o  the 
Wynberg mil i tary  camp, where they were bound by minor r e s t r i c t i o n s  and became 
charges of the government. Ultimately, the re  were about 600 men i n  t h e  camp, under 
canvas, and supplied with blankets, r a t ions  and cooking u tens i l s .  (56) 
But ships  d id  g e t  away i n  increasing numbers a s  scabs were employed ( a t  
59.10s per month), o r  a s  men d r i f t e d  back t o  the  ships. The l a t t e r  were always a 
t iny  minority, and they faced a barrage of abuse from t h e i r  fellows. The scabs were 
mostly unemployed whites. They were def iant  and generally impervious t o  the  pleas 
of the  men on s t r i k e .  (57) 
A Labour "Coupvt, and the  End of the  S t r ike  
Except f o r  the  ag i t a t ion  over the  l a sca r s ,  the  s t r i k e  seemed t o  have involved only 
whites, and t h a t  mainly a s  sympathisers. These whites d id  not  contemplate 
indus t r i a l  act ion t o  support the  seamen, and a t  most the  unions passed the  h a t  
around. A s  ea r ly  a s  31 August African stevedores i n  Durban were sa id  t o  be 
discussing s t r i k e  ac t ion (581, but  the  ac t ion seems t o  have been stopped. 
One week l a t e r ,  the General Secretary of the  I C U  i n  Cape Town informed 
Clement Kadalie, the  President, t h a t  dockers were discussing s t r i k e  ac t ion  if t h e i r  
demands f o r  be t t e r  wages and conditions were not  met. He was a l s o  informed t h a t  the  
s t r i k e  committee i n  London sen t  a cable t o  the  crew of the  "Arundel Castlew, v i a  the  
I C U  office i n  Cape Town, s t a t i n g  t h a t  the  s t r i k e  was l*solid" i n  London, and c a l l i n g  
on the  s t r i k e r s  t o  s t ay  firm. (59) The response of Kadalie was bizarre:  he offered 
t o  take over negotiat ions on behalf of the  seamen (60) and no more was heard of 
s t r i k e  ac t ion (or  the  negotiat ions!) .  Members of the I C U  d id  support the  seamen a t  
meetings i n  Cape Town - but  seem t o  have forsworn s t r i k e  action a t  the  time. 
Meanwhile, la rge  numbers of seamen were charged f o r  disobeying orders, and 
only managed t o  s t ay  out  of  goal  pending appeals. For t h i s  b a i l  was required,  and a 
large  p a r t  of loca l  a c t i v i t y  was t i e d  t o  fund ra is ing.  The t rade  unions provided 
considerable sums (61) ,  and t h i s  was used by R S tua r t ,  Secretary of  the  Federation.  
of Trades t o  break the  s t r i k e  committee's connection with the  CPSA. In  l a t e  
September, Stuar t  invi ted  the  s t r i k e r s  t o  switch t h e i r  headquarters t o  h i s  off ices .  
When t h i s  was re jec ted,  he threatened t h a t  the  unions would have t o  reconsider the 
support they offered (62);  a few days l a t e r  the  committee capi tu la ted  and moved 
headquarters t o  the  o f f i ces  of the Federation. (63) This did not  end the  matter: a 
s t r i k e  bu l l e t in  issued by the  men c r i t i c i s e d  the  Federation, and the re  w a s  an 
immediate suspension of money f o r  the  s t r i k e .  The committee thought of cu t t ing  
a d r i f t  from the  Federation, but on second thoughts they sought a compromise. (64) 
Trade union s o l i d a r i t y  had been converted i n t o  f s d ,  and ass is tance  had become 
blackmail. There was no excuse f o r  S t u a r t ' s  behaviour, but  he was only following 
standard pract ice ,  l e s s  honestly but more ef fect ively .  
The s t r i k e  was i n  its clos ing phase, and although the  economy of South 
Africa was experiencing d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  with the  wool producers facing d i sas te r ,  the  
bank exchange r a t e  moving agains t  t h e  l o c a l  currency, and gold still stuck i n  the  
country, the  shipowners i n  Br i ta in  and the  NSFU refused t o  allow any 
concessions. (65) Consequently, moves had t o  come from the  seamen, who were 
receiving repor ts  of hardship from t h e i r  families.  On 10 October the  Durban 
s t r i k e r s  decided by 311 votes t o  230 t o  accept an agreement reached by t h e i r  
representatives and the  shippers t o  end the  s t r i k e  under protes t .  There w a s  
agreement t h a t  there  would be no vict imisations,  no prosecutions on re tu rn  t o  
Br i ta in ,  clean discharges and the  customary opportunity of se lec t ing  the  next 
voyage. Men whose ships  had already departed would be repa t r i a t ed  and would a l s o  
g e t  clean discharges. (66) The terms were communicated t o  the  AMWU, who recommended 
acceptance, and on the  12th t h a t  body cal led  off  the s t r i k e  i n  Britain.  (67) 
There were st i l l  men who refused t o  re turn ,  and the  s t r i k e  was far from 
over i n  Australia. But t h e  sh ips  were s a i l i n g  regularly;  stranded passengers had 
gone, produce and other  goods were moved, and i n  December some 500-600 d e s t i t u t e  
seamen were shipped home by the  South African government. (68) 
The Impact on South Africa 
The s t r i k e  was not  of South African or ig in ,  and the major impact of t h e  event must 
be sought i n  Britain.  None the  l e s s ,  f o r  two months there  had been s t r i k e r s  i n  the  
main por ts ,  and thousands of l o c a l  c i t i z e n s  had become involved. They were 
obviously affected,  but  i n  the  absence of any record of t h e i r  react ions ,  during o r  
a f t e r  the  event, the  h i s to r i an  is l e f t  t o  sum up with surmises r a the r  than hard 
fac t .  
Ultimately, the  s t r i k e  had f a i l e d ,  and f a i l u r e s  tend t o  lead t o  a l o s s  of 
morale amongst those who supported the  action.  Consequently, there  could be no r i s e  
i n  s p i r i t s  amongst the  members of the  CPSA, and Biruski, who had invested so  much 
energy i n  leading the  men, was d e s t i t u t e ,  and without employment. But the  problem 
was not t h a t  of an individual: the re  had been l i t t l e  p o l i t i c a l  education during the  
47 days, and, despite the  s o l i d a r i t y  they had displayed i n  t h i s  r a r e  case of an 
in ternat ional  s t r i k e ,  there  could be few pos i t ive  gains f o r  the  CPSA a s  a r e s u l t  of 
t h e i r  involvement. 
The white unions gained l i t t l e  ( i f  anything) despite t h e i r  support f o r  
t h i s  in ternat ional  working-class ac t ion - and even t h i s  was blemished by the  
pressures put  on the  s t r i k e r s  i n  Cape Town, with the t h r e a t  o f  fund withdrawal. 
Furthermore, the  par ty  which many of them supported showed, from the  beginning of  
the  s t r i k e ,  t h a t  it was s p l i t .  The SALP had been i n  the  government f o r  barely a 
year when it was confronted by the  seamen's ac t ion,  and t h e  d ivis ion i n  t h e i r  ranks 
was a warning of  events t o  come. In  1928 the  party was torn  apart :  Creswell 
remaining a supporter of the  Pact government, and Madely leading a minority who 
broke ranks. The differences i n  1925 undoubtedly contributed t o  the dissension 
ins ide  the  party,  but t o  what degree is unknown. (69) 
The Labour Party s ta lwar ts  who played a p a r t  i n  the  events i n  Natal, 
pa r t i cu la r ly  D r  Minnie Alper ( 7 0 ) ,  who conveyed messages of s o l i d a r i t y  and provided 
money and provisions, continued f o r  many years t o  work f o r  the  SALP. But Kemp and 
Simons did not make the  headlines again, and t h e i r  fu r the r  a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  not  known. 
The Indian community was rel ieved of the  f e a r  t h a t  l a sca r s  might intervene 
and make t h e i r  pos i t ion more uncomfortable. They continued with t h e i r  ag i t a t ion  f o r  
a Round Table conference, and this was convened i n  1927. Neither the  conference nor 
its outcome seems t o  have been affected by the  s t r i k e .  What might have become 
obvious t o  more rad ica l  elements i n  the  community was the  timorousness of  the  
leadership, i f  indeed they needed any fu r the r  evidence. 
The g rea tes t  impact of  the  s t r i k e  was on the  country 's  economy, and, 
whatever the  tendencies i n  economic planning a t  the  time, the  event must have helped 
concentrate minds sharply on the  physical i so la t ion  of the  country. This had been 
obvious during the  F i r s t  World W a r ,  and was now brought home again. I n  the  absence 
of a loca l  f l e e t ,  the  need t o  develop manufacture must have been obvious. The 
his tor ian  can only guess a t  the  impetus t h i s  l e n t  t o  plans t o  bui ld  up the  s t e e l  and 
other indust r ies :  a more important f ac to r  than those usually advanced, involving 
attempts t o  secure employment f o r  "poor whites". It is not  necessary t o  propose 
t h a t  the  s t r i k e  w a s  t he  overriding fac to r  t o  see  t h a t  it must have played a p a r t  i n  
speeding government intervention i n  the  development of l o c a l  industry,  but  it w i l l  
remain a guess u n t i l  we learn  more of  the s t r i k e ' s  e f f e c t  on local: thinking. 
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